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The Intersection of Intellectual Property and
Race in the Twenty-First Century: An
Examination of the Interpretation of Racial
Categories in Patent Law
TIFFANY CRUZ GONZALEZ*
Introduction
A spree of rapes and murders took place in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana in 2003.1 The DNA gathered at the respective murder
scenes linked at least five of the women's murders.2 Because of an
eyewitness testimony that reported a white male leaving the vicinity
of one of the crime scenes and studies that suggested that most
serial killers are white, "police collected DNA samples from more
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1. Nancy Touchette, Genome Tests Nets Suspected Serial Killer, GENOME NEWS
NETWORK, June 13, 2003, http://www.genomenewsnetwork.org/articles/06_03/
serial.shtml.
2. Id.
[l]
than 1,000 white males."3 No match was found. The police then
received a phone call from Tony Frudakis, the founder of DNAPrint
Genomics, 4 promising that he could "provide a physical description
of the killer based on a novel genomic test" called DNAWitness.5
"The genomic test 6 revealed that the killer's heritage was
approximately 85 perfect African" and 15 percent Native American
with a "moderately dark skin tone."7 Based on that information the
police broadened their search to include black males and found an
exact match in Derrick Todd Lee's DNA sample.8 In December
2004, the jury in the Parish of West Baton Rouge trial court
convicted Lee of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death by
lethal injection.9
Frudakis determined Lee's heritage using a method that
incorporates "admixture mapping," a technique that "examines
genetic markers on non-sex chromosomes that contain DNA from
both parents to estimate a person's percentages of African, Native
American, European, and East Asian ancestry."10  DNAPrint
Genomics introduced and heavily marketed this method to the
forensic community before applying for a patent with the Patent
and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). Obtaining a patent on this
method is highly desirable because a patent will grant Frudakis with
the exclusive right to make, use, or sell this method for a period of
twenty years.1" Frudakis filed a patent application for DNAWitness
on August 19, 2003, which is still under examination by the USPTO.
3. Id.
4. DNAPrint Genomics is a company based in Florida that researches and develops
products and services in the areas of pharmacogenomics, forensics, and genotyping.
5. Touchette, supra note 1.
6. A genomic test looks at groups of genes and how active they are. Arguably, this
activity can identify traits of an individual.
7. Touchette, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. State v. Lee, 964 So.2d 967 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (upholding the conviction and
sentence in later state supreme court proceedings).
10. Osagie K. Obasogie, Playing the Gene Card? A Report on Race and Human
Biotechnology, CENTER FOR GENETICS AND SOCIETY, Feb. 2009, at 24-28 (Admixture
mapping checks "markers that are thought to be related to certain ancestral
backgrounds. The alleles, or genetic variants, used as markers are "those that have the
most uniqueness, or the largest differences in allele frequency among populations...
For example, a database might show that one genetic marker is prevalent among
samples from West Africans but not Native Americans, leading the admixture test to
conclude that any person with this marker has some West-African heritage. While most
genetic markers do not reflect this type of variation, admixture mapping relies upon the
few markers that do and are also connected to a geographically distinct population."); See
also, DNAPRINT GENOMICS, SCIENCE, available at http://www.dnaprint.com/
welcome/science/.
11. Obasogie, supra note 10, at 2-3.
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For the reasons outlined below, the author asserts that if this patent
were granted, this method would be an example of a race-based
technology that "reinforce[s] the myth that racial categories are
natural rather than a classification system invented for political
ends." 12
A patent application is comprised of (1) one or more claim
terms and (2) a written description that discloses the details of the
invention. The claims of a patent define exactly what the invention
is. Consequently, claims are the most important part of the patent
because they are determinative of what a patent holder may assert
as their exclusive right. In the patent application for DNAWitness,
Frudakis claims a method for inferring a trait of an individual -such
as eye color, responsiveness to a therapeutic drug, susceptibility to
disease, hair color and skin color-based on the genetic markers in a
person's DNA. The trait "biogeographical ancestry" which is
defined in the patent application as the "heritable component of
race ... describ[ing] the biological or genetic component of race."13
Frudakis' assertion of a biological or genetic component of race, in
addition to the use of the phrase, heritable component of race, advances
the previously discredited belief that racial differences and racial
disparities are a result of inherent biological differences between
racial groups. Frudakis speaks about genes and ancestry in terms of
mixtures, which "seems to presume that racial purity exists, or
existed at one time." This gives a "misleading impression that
genetically distinct populations are real and that social categories of
race are genetically verifiable." 14 Therefore, if the USPTO grants the
patent, DNAWitness would contribute to the "resurgence of
scientific interest in race-based genetic variation." 5 This resurgent
trend is not limited to DNAWitness but is also seen in various race-
based medicines, genetic ancestry tests, and various DNA forensic
applications.16
12. Id. at xi.
13. U.S. Patent Appl. No. 10/644,594 at [00071-[0155] (filed Aug. 19, 2003) (The
patent application is still under examination by the USPTO. The prosecution history of
the '594 patent shows an extensive back and forth with the patent examiner. In most
cases, the patent examiner rejected the patent for not meeting the statutory requirements
of patentability. Frudakis then revised his application, by either adding to claim terms or
completely eliminating claims. Frudakis cancelled Claim 3 on July 10, 2007 and
therefore the claim for biogeographical ancestry, the "heritable component of race" used to
"describe the biological or genetic component of race," is no longer a part of the patent
application before the USPTO. However, for the purposes of this paper, the original
patent application, that includes the claim over biogeographical ancestry, will be
analyzed.).
14. Obasogie, supra note 10, at 28.
15. Id. at xi.
16. See Id. at 2 ("Drug companies are beginning to offer medicines for specific racial
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Current literature has discussed the dangerous societal
implications in granting patents on race-based technologies,
medicines, and methods, specifically when racial categories, such as
African American or Black, are used as claim terms in patents.
Patents that cover inventions aimed at certain racially or ethnically
defined groups, known as race-specific patents, strategically use
racialized claim terms as a genetic category17 to obtain patent
protection. 8  Both Professor Kahn and Professor Ghosh have
written extensively about the patentability of various race-specific
patents.19 Neither professor, however, has thoroughly explored
how the use of racial categories as claim terms in patent litigation
will impact society's future understanding of race.
In considering the theoretical and practical issues that arise in
patent litigation when racial categories are used as claim terms, the
author establishes the following premises: (1) there is not a set
definition for "race" and history has shown that the interpretation of
race as solely a scientific category has dangerous implications on
society; (2) there is a direct relationship between the court's use of
language and society's applications of the terms; and (3) if the courts
adopt a scientific interpretation of "race," then such understanding
is more than likely to permeate society. Accordingly, since the
process of litigating these claims informs and has power to influence
society's understanding of the concept of race in the twenty-first
century, a more socially contextual and representative interpretation
of racial categories should be incorporated.
For the reader unfamiliar with patent law, Part I provides a
groups, suggesting that genetic differences between races are significant determinants of
health disparities. Genetic tests are being marketed to provide answers about our
ancestry that were thought to be lost forever due to past geopolitical conflicts. And
biotech companies are offering law enforcement agencies high-tech tools with which to
profile and catch criminals.").
17. The author will use genetic category interchangeably with "scientific category"
and "biological category."
18. Jonathan Kahn, Race-ing Patents/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political Geography of
Intellectual Property in Biotechnology, 92 IOWA L. REV. 355, 386 (2007).
19. Id. at 359 (examining the theoretical and practical implications of racial
biotechnology patents and concluding that "biotechnology corporations are mining the
raw material of race as a social category and using the patent process to refine it into a
natural construct in order to gain patent protection and market advantage"); Jonathan
Kahn, How a Drug Becomes 'Ethnic': Law, Commerce, and the Production of Racial Categories
in Medicine, 4 YALE. J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 2-5 (2004); Jonathan Kahn, What's the
Use? Law and Authority in Patenting Human Genetic Material, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 417,
418 (2003); Shubha Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual
Property Policy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 416 (2008) (documenting the use of racial categories
in patent law, analyzing issues raised by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and developing a critical cultural theory of intellectual property to assess
race-specific patents).
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basic understanding of the statutory and common law requirements
for obtaining and maintaining a patent. Part II discusses the
"reification of race" as a scientific category, first looking at the
development of race science and then discussing the implications of
a modern race science. Part III then provides a brief discussion of
how language used in the courtroom impacts society's
understanding of those terms and concepts. Part IV begins with a
thorough explanation of claim construction while introducing the
issues that a judge may face when construing claims in patent
litigation. Then, the attempted construction of a "heritable
component of race" displays how the interpretation of racial
categories amplifies the difficulties of claim construction. Finally,
Part V recognizes the dilemma district court judges will face in
construing racial categories as claim terms and suggests a manner in
which judges should understand and give meaning to the concept of
race.
I. Brief Overview Of Patent Law
Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution
authorizes Congress to enact laws "[t]o promote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and useful [airts, by securing for limited [t]imes to
[a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective
[w]ritings and [d]iscoveries." 20 Congress then enacted the first
patent law which provided that anyone who had "invented or
discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device
or any improvement therein not before known or used [shall have]
the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing,
using and vending to other to be used [for a term not to exceed
fourteen years]." 21 While this law has been revised by Congress on
several occasions, however, the core tenets of the law remain.
Patents are granted by the USPTO. The process of obtaining a patent is
called patent prosecution. A valid patent confers to the patent owner the
right to prevent others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell the
patented invention without the patent holder's permission. A violation of
this right is called infringement. A patent holder may attempt to enforce a
patent against alleged infringers by filing a lawsuit in federal court.
A. The Patent Application
In order to obtain a patent, one must file an application with the
20. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
21. Peter Menell, Lynn H. Pasahow, James Pooley & Matthew D. Powers, Patent Case
Management Judicial Manual, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 2009, at 11-1.
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USPTO, who employs trained examiners to review patent
applications. The application includes a "specification which must
contain a written description of the invention describing what the
invention is, how it works, how to make it and how to use it so other
skilled in the field will know how to make or use it."22 The
specification concludes with one or more numbered claims. If the
patent is granted, these claims will "define the boundaries of its
protection and give notice to the public of those boundaries." 23 In
other words, the claims of a patent limit the inventor's exclusive
rights in the same way physical boundaries limit real property
rights.24 Each claim bestows distinct legal rights and must be stated
in a single sentence.
After an application is filed, the patent examiner reviews the
application to determine whether each of the claims are: of
patentable subject matter;25 define an invention that is new; 26
useful;27 not obvious in view of prior art,2 8 and whether the
22. Model Patent Jury Instructions for the N. D. Cal. at 1 (2007).
23. Id.
24. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and
Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1025 (2007).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (requiring the claims of an invention to be a "process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"). The Supreme Court has held that
anything made by humans, found in nature, applications of scientific principles to real
problems, and non-naturally occurring living organisms that are produced through
genetic engineering may be patentable subject matter, however, an abstract idea, natural
phenomenon, or natural law is not patentable subject matter. See Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (finding manifestations of laws of nature are "free to all men and re-
served exclusively to none"); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S.
86, 94 (1939) ("[A] scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable
invention."); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd,
196 F. 496 (1912) (upholding a patent on the composition of a purified form of
adrenaline, DNA sequence derived from a living organism as long as patentee can
establish utility).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (setting forth two requirements (1) the inventor was the
first to invent and (2) the inventor filed the patent application in a timely manner). The
patent will not issue if the applicant is not the first to invent. See Townsend v. Smith, 36
F.2d 292 (CCPA 1929) (finding a conception of the claimed invention is "the complete
performance of the mental part of the inventive art," a "definite and permanent idea of
the complete and operative invention."). The timely filing requirements promote
prompt disclosure by making the patentee file an application within one year of various
triggering events--invention was on sale or in public use in the United States, described
in a printed publication anywhere in the world. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v.
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[tihe nonsecret use of a claimed
process in the usual course of producing articles for commercial purposes is a public
use."); Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(interpreting printed publication material as a reference that is "sufficiently accessible to
the public interested in the art.").
27. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (requiring the invention be "useful" in order to be
6 HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND RACE
specification adequately describes the invention claims by meeting
the disclosure requirement 29 which calls for a written description3 o
that enables a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the
invention,31 and a disclosure of the invention's best mode.32 In
patentable). Utility is determined from the perspective of a person having ordinary skill
in the art. The issue of utility arises most when inventors seek patents on compositions
of matter before they have utility. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) (requiring
patentees to establish credible, specific, and substantial utility); see In re Fisher, 421 F.3d
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding the utility claimed must be specific to the subject matter
claimed and can "provide a well-defined and particular benefit to the public"); but see,
Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 728 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding an invention does
not have to be better than other technologies, show commercial success, or be morally
acceptable to possess substantial utility).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (setting forth a requirement that a patent may not be issued
if the "differences between the subject matter sought and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time of the invention to a
person having ordinary skill in the art"). Prior art includes things that existed before the
claimed invention, that were publicly known, or used in a publicly accessible way in this
country, or that were patented or described in a publication in any country. Courts
determine obviousness by looking at the "scope and content of the prior art," the
"differences between the prior art and the claims at issue" and the "level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art." Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17
(1966). When determining the level of the ordinary skill in the art, courts look at the
inventor's education level, the nature of the field's typical problems, the skill required to
grapple with the prior solutions to the field's problems, the pace of innovation in the
field, the sophistication of technology, and the educational level of the people working
in the field. Menell, supra note 21, at 11-47 (citing Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co.,
713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007).
29. In order to apprise the public of what has been discovered and what is still open
to them, the patentee must meet the disclosure requirement, requiring that the
application contain the following: (1) a written description of the invention, (2) an
enabling description of the invention, and (3) the best mode of carrying out the
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
30. The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 1 (2006);
see Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(holding all patent claims must find adequate support in the written description of the
invention, which "prevent[s] an applicant from later asserting that he invented that
which he did not").
31. To satisfy the enablement requirement, the specification must describe "manner
and process of making and using [the invention] in such full, clear, concise exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same" without undue experimentation. 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, T 1 (2006); see In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (setting forth the
following factors to consider when determining whether the experimentation is undue:
"(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the
invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the
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addition, the patent examiner is looking to determine whether the
specification provides claims that are sufficiently definite to provide
notice to the public of the extent of legal protection afforded by the
patent.33
After the application is examined, the patent examiner informs
the applicant whether any claim is patentable, and thereby allowed.
If the examiner rejects any or all of the claims, the applicant can
respond and change the claims or submit new claims. This process
can continue until the examiner is satisfied that the application and
claims meet the statutory requirements of patentability. The
documents representing the communication between the applicant
and examiner make up the prosecution history, which is available to
the public.
B. Asserting One's Patent Rights
There are two main aspects of patent litigation: (1) the
determination of whether the patent is valid and (2) the
determination of whether infringement has occurred or will occur.
Simply because the USPTO has granted a patent does not indicate
that any invention claimed in the patent deserves the protection of a
patent. An alleged infringer has the right to argue that a claimed
invention in the patent is invalid because it does not meet any one
element of the patentability requirements. On that same token,
given the presumption of validity, a patentee can enforce their
patent rights against someone who is allegedly making or selling the
invention without the patentee's permission. In most cases, when a
predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.").
32. The best mode requirement is satisfied when the specification sets forth "the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112, T 1
(2006); see Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(requiring "an inventor to disclose the best mode contemplated by him, as of the time he
executes the application, of carrying out the invention" defined by the claims).
33. The specification "shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention."35 U.S.C. § 112, 2 (2006); see Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417
F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding the definiteness requirement does not require
"absolute clarity," rather, as long as the claims are "not amenable to construction" or
"insolubly ambiguous," the claims are not indefinite); Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,
376 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding unlike the written description, enablement,
and best mode requirements, the definiteness requirement is a question of law to be
determined by the district court judge); Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 216 F.3d 1372,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (The definiteness requirement is satisfied when a PHOSITA "would
understand the bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification ... [and]
reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention."); Verve LLC v.
Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding the words "substantially,"
"about," or "closely approximate" does not necessarily render a claim indefinite).
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patentee chooses to enforce their right to exclude, the alleged
infringer will either counter-claim that the patent is invalid and does
not meet the statutory requirements, or claim the alleged infringing
device is actually not infringing. Patent litigation involves a two-
step process. The first step is the interpretation of patent claims,
formally known as claim construction. The second step is
comparing the properly interpreted claims with the accused device
to determine infringement or invalidity. 34 This note will focus solely
on the first step, claim construction.
Claim construction is quite often the centerpiece of patent
litigation as "it is central to the evaluation of infringement and
validity, and can affect or determine the outcome of other significant
issues such as unenforceability, enablement, and remedies."35
Before the Supreme Court decided the seminal case, Markman v.
Westview Instruments, 36 it was common for courts to include claim
construction as a part of the jury's charge. Consequently, the
complexity, unpredictability, and instability of trial increased
significantly. In Markman, the Court found that judges are better
equipped to promote uniformity and certainty in claim construction
than any jury, particularly because courts are "better situated to give
due weight to decisions of other courts that have previously ruled
on the same issues."37 Therefore, the Court held that the meaning
and scope of the claims is an issue of law, to be decided by the
court.38
Markman hearings are referred to as "evidentiary hearings"
because they occur before a judge sometime before trial.39 During a
Markman hearing, the district court judge will "define the
boundaries of the patent by interpreting the claim." 40 Before a
34. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1466-67 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
35. Menell, supra note 21, at 5-3.
36. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
37. Menell, supra note 21, at 5-4; Lefstin, supra note 24, at 1030 ("[Tireating claim
interpretation as a question of law would promote uniformity of interpretation given
that all patent appeals were resolved by the Federal Circuit.").
38. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996); See Menell,
supra note 21, at 5-4 ("The Court emphasized that judges are better equipped than juries
to construe the meaning of patent claim terms given their training and experience
interpreting written instruments.").
39. See, EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887, 891-892 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
40. Lefstin, supra at note 24, 1025; NTP v. Research in Motion, 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) ("Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and
technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by
the claims, for use in the determination of infringement."); See also Terlep v. The
Brinkmann Corp., 418 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("Construction of claims is simply
a way of elaborating normally terse claim language in order to understand and explain,
but not change, the scope of the claims.") (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216
F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
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Markman hearing, the parties involved and the judge identify the
disputed claim terms. Lay words as simple as "a" and "steering
wheel" to technical terms such as "hydroxypropyl methylcellulose"
may be disputed claim terms, so long as there is a meaningful
dispute as to the meaning of the term between the parties.41 "If a
claim term is non-technical, is in plain English, and derives no
special meaning from the patent and its prosecution history, then
the court has no need to function as a thesaurus." 42 In fact, doing so
may "encroach upon the factfinder's domain."43
Once the disputed claims are determined by the judge, the
Markman hearing commences. Courts have broad discretion in how
they conduct the Markman hearing. The court's role is to
"understand the ordinary meaning that a PHOSITA would give to
claim terms in the context of the patent, and to construe the term in
view of that ordinary meaning in light of intrinsic and non-
contradictory extrinsic evidence." 44 Ordinary meaning of a claim
term is determined by looking at what a person having ordinary
skill in the art ("PHOSITA") would understand as the meaning of
the term at the time of the invention. Therefore, the judge's task is
to interpret the claims through the eyes of a PHOSITA. A PHOSITA
is "deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with an
understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have knowledge
of any special meaning and usage in the field."4 5 "Interpreting
patent claims thus requires the court to consider the same resources
as would that person, viz., the patent specification and the
prosecution history." 46  Accordingly, the court must consider
intrinsic evidence, in light of extrinsic evidence.47
The Court in Philips v. AWH Corporation distinguished intrinsic
evidence from extrinsic evidence, finding that intrinsic evidence is
found in the public record associated with the patent: The patent
itself, the prosecution history-which is the record of
correspondence between the applicant and the USPTO-and the
prior art cited therein. The prosecution history "can often inform
the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the
41. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy and only to the extent
necessary to resolve the controversy.).
42. Menell, supra note 21, at 5-23.
43. See U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon Inc., 103 F. 3d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Claim
construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to
clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use
in the determination of infringement. It is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.").
44. Menell, supra note 21, at 5-23.
45. Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
46. Menell, supra note 21, at 5-45 (internal quotations omitted).
47. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315-21 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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inventor understood the invention."48 On the other hand, since the
"prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the
USPTO and the applicant rather than the final product of that
negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is
less useful for claim construction purposes."49 Accordingly, of the
intrinsic evidence, the specification is the single best guide for
determining the meaning of a claim.
In addition, the Court in Philips recognized that the extrinsic
evidence-the evidence that is outside the official administrative
record of the patent such as inventor and expert testimony,
dictionaries, or treatises-may be considered if the court finds it
helpful to "education [equate itself] regarding the field of
invention ... [and to] determine what a person of ordinary skill in
the art would understand the claim terms to mean."o However, the
Court also emphasized that the extrinsic evidence must be
considered "in the context of intrinsic evidence" as the extrinsic
evidence is "less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history
in determining how to read claim terms." 51
Also, during claim construction, a court may deal with a claim
that may be indefinite. Indefiniteness is a dispositive issue, which
requires that the claim of a patent "particularly point[] out and
distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention." 52 "When a claim cannot be construed, it is indefinite,
and therefore invalid."53 Additionally, even when "a claim can be
construed, but cannot meaningfully be applied, then claim is also
invalid for indefiniteness." 54
The test for definiteness, as defined in Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety
Travel Chairs, Inc., is whether "those skilled in the art [with
knowledge of the prior art] would understand what is claimed
when the claim is read in light of the specification."55 As such, if the
language is as precise as the subject matter permits, the courts can
demand no more.56 This test was further elaborated in Datamize LLC
48. Id. at 1317.
49. Id.
50. Id at 1319.
51. Id. (adding that extrinsic evidence "by definition is not part of the patent and
does not have the specification's virtue of being created at the time of patent prosecution
for the purpose of explaining the patent's scope and meaning" and that "extrinsic
publications may not be written by or for skilled artisans and therefore may not reflect
the understanding of a skilled artisan in the field of the patent").
52. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
53. Menell, supra note 21, at 5-75.
54. Menell, supra note 21, at 5-75.
55. 806 F.2d 1565, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
56. Id. (finding that mathematical precision is not required, knowledge of one of skill
in the art gives meaning to those terms, and patents are written by and for persons of
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v. Plumtree Software, Inc. There, the court required the patentee to
identify an objective measurement standard when claim terms are
entirely subjective.57 An objective standard must be provided in
order to allow the public to determine the scope of the claimed
invention.58 Therefore, the scope of the claimed invention cannot
depend solely upon unrestrained, subjective opinion of a person
supposedly practicing the invention.59  A purely subjective
construction of a claim term would not notify the public of the
patentee's right to exclude since the meaning of the claim language
would depend upon the unpredictable vagaries of any one person's
opinion.60
II. Implications of the Reification of Race as a
Scientific Category
The reification of race is the "transform[ation of] race as a social
concept into a specific, definite, concrete, and now presumably
genetic category which can feed back into preexisting lay
understandings of racial difference." 61 The movement towards
reification is found in the appeal of "naturaliz[ing] the social order
in a racially stratified society" by "link[ing] race to medical and
scientific progress." 62 The reification of race can potentially result
from both the conferring of and the litigation of race-specific
patents. In order for race-specific patents to obtain patent
protection, the racial categories must be interpreted as a fixed
genetic trait and not as a social concept. Accordingly, social
concepts of race are integrated into the substantive claims of patents
and then transformed into a novel and nonobvious genetic
category.63 In other words, race is a property that may confer
patentability on certain subject matter "because it is reified as
genetic; and it is reified as genetic in order to render it patentable."64
Therefore, as patents are racialized, racial identity becomes a
patentable commodity and "raises the specter that race can and will
become an accepted biological category upon which differences may
skill in the art).
57. Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1350.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. (emphasizing the perspective of the PHOSITA claims are not judged based on
a lay person understanding the boundaries of the claims).
61. Obasogie, supra note 10, at 5.
62. Id. at xii.
63. Kahn, supra note 18, at 360.
64. Id. at 401.
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actually turn."65
Alternatively, during the litigation of a race-specific patent, a
district court judge has the opportunity to construe the racialized
claim terms. A claim construction that adopts a scientific
understanding of race arguably indicates the court's approval of
race-based genetic variation and may give an "undue legitimacy to
the idea that social categories of race reflect discrete biological
differences." 66 The next section will discuss the historical
development of race as a scientific category to establish an
understanding of the implications of the reification of race as a
scientific category.
A. The Development of Race as a Scientific Category
There is no definite, or even consistent, meaning to race. At the
most basic level, race can be understood as a "grouping of
individuals according to some perceived shared characteristic,
experience, or history."67 Unsurprisingly, throughout history, the
meaning and definition of race was, and still is, entirely "dependent
on context, perspective, and time." 68 Accordingly, the way race was
understood during a time period, "reflect[ed] in large part an
understanding of how society account[ed] for human difference and
similarities." 69 Thus, those in the position to group individuals
alleged that such grouping furthered various socially acceptable
ends, such as the spread of religious belief or the increase of
economic development. Thereby using these ends as a justification
for the means to establish racial insubordination through actions
such as slavery and sterilization.
The movement to spread religious beliefs led to one of the first
racial classifications developed in late 1600s, where individuals were
grouped as either Christians or nonhuman non-Christians.70 This
grouping distinction justified the enslavement of non-European
people, the nonhuman non-Christians. 71 That same grouping
distinction also served as the justification for the enslavement of
65. Alex M. Johnson, The Re-Emergence of Race as a Biological Category: The Social
Implications - Reaffirmation of Race, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1547, 1556 (2009).
66. Obasogie, supra note 10, at viii.
67. Christian Sundquist, The Meaning of Race in the DNA Era: Science, History, and the
Law, 27 TEMP. J. SC. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 231, 233 (2008).
68. Timothy, Caulfield, Defining 'Race' as the Defining Problem, 45 HouS. L. REV. 1475,
1476 (2009).
69. Sundquist, supra note 67, at 237.
70. Id. at 234.
71. Id.
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Blacks in the creation of the institution of American slavery. 72 Black
slaves were considered heathens and therefore would never be
Christians.73 American slavery also found justification for the racial
grouping in the need to develop and strengthen the new country's
economy.74 However, as the institution of American slavery grew
further and further into an immoral institution, finding justification
in religious and economic goals was inadequate.75 Accordingly
scientific studies, grounded in "anatomy, physiology, and biology,"
provided an objective justification for the subordinated treatment of
Blacks, Native Americans, and other racial minorities as inferior
beings. 76 These studies established that these beings were either an
entirely separate breed of humankind or less evolved than their
White counterparts.77
For instance, one scientific study "purported to objectively
[find] that slaves had a disease ... which caused slaves to attempt to
escape enslavement." 78 Therefore, a biological disease and not an
innate human desire for social equality caused slaves to rebel. In
addition, Dr. Morton alleged definitive empirical evidence of black
inferiority based on the cranial capacity of 800 skulls.79 These
findings were used to, once again, establish that blacks were not
only of a lower race, but a completely different species, thereby
providing a "scientific" justification for the institution of slavery.80
Dr. Morton's studies were taken further into the realm of
"anthropometry" where bodies of blacks were examined for
differences from the perfect default measurement standard of
whites.81
The use of biological theories of race by the American
institution of slavery was not limited to the United States but was
prevalent across the globe. Understanding race in terms of
biological difference was legitimized by the theory of Social
Darwinism, which applied Darwin's evolutionary theory 82 to
72. Id. at 239.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 240.
75. Id. at 239.
76. Id. at 240.
77. Obasogie, supra note 10, at viii.
78. Sundquist, supra note 67, at 234.
79. Id. at 241.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 242.
82. Id. at 243 (Darwin has discussed his perspective of race stating, "[alithough the
existing races of man differ in many respects as in color, hair, shape of skull, proportions
of the body, etc., yet if their whole structure be taken into consideration they are found
to resemble each other closely in a multitude of points. Many of these are so
unimportant or of so singular a nature that it is extremely improbable that they should
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"explain and justify racial and class inequality." 83 According to the
theory of Social Darwinism, different races represented different
positions on the evolutionary ladder. Therefore, "people suffering
from social inequality were necessarily genetically inferior and thus
not equal to the ruling class."84 The Social Darwinist movement
then fueled the Eugenics movement. The Eugenics movement
actively advanced the development of the perfect human race
through the scientific promotion of a superior genetic hereditary
trait and the inhibition of the transmission of inferior genetic stock.85
The Eugenic movement's "approach to [solving] social problems
[were found] in biology rather than social structure." 86 Accordingly,
Eugenic programs "sought to improve society by eliminating
disfavored people instead of social inequalities ... making the social
order seem natural[,J casting its inequitable features as biological
facts." 87 Both theories of Social Darwinism and Eugenics served as
the foundation for the immigration restrictions, forced sterilization,
and the Holocaust.88
The devastating repercussions of immigration restrictions,
forced sterilization, and the Holocaust allegedly brought an end to
the biological theories of racial difference. During the post Second
World War era, an new understanding emerged: "humanity is one
species, environmental and social pressures play a significant part in
the variations observed across human groups and their outcomes,
and the racial distinctions drawn by society reflect shifting cultural,
political, and economic forces." 89 This understanding was further
legitimized in 1993 when the United States Department of Energy
and the National Institute of Health mapped the entire human
genome. This undertaking, known as the Human Genome Project,
provided an understanding of the way "genes influence health
outcomes."90 Most importantly, the Human Genome Project, in
addition to subsequent research, found that "there is less than 1
[percent] genetic variation among all humans." 91 Finding "high
levels of genetic similarity within the human species" with the most
"genetic variation occurring within populations, not between them"
confirmed that race is a concept that is "socially, politically, and
have been independently acquired by aboriginally distinct species or races.").
83. Id.
84. Id. at 244.
85. Id. at 245.
86. Obasogie, supra note 10, at xiii.
87. Id. at xiii.
88. Sundquist, supra note 67, at 245.
89. Obasogie, supra note 10, at 2.
90. Id. at 2.
91. Id. at vii.
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legally constructed." 92
While the Human Genome Project and subsequent research has
made great strides in eliminating the understanding of race as a
biological category, a "resurgence of scientific interest in race-based
genetic variation" 93 threatens further progress. The Human
Genome Project established a 99.9 percent similarity amongst all
human beings, yet there are "increasing efforts to demonstrate the
genetic relevance of race by mapping this less than 1 [percent] of
variation onto social categories of race to find genetic explanations
for racial disparities and differences." 94 While there is evidence that
"socially constructed notions of race may loosely reflect patterns of
genetic variation created by evolutionary forces," given the "history
of linking biological understandings of racial difference to notions of
racial superiority and inferiority," there is a possibility that race-
specific patents may be used to "revive long discredited [nineteenth]
century theories of race." 9 5
B. The Implications
The purpose in the development of race science was to justify
racial discrimination. Understanding differences between human
beings based on notions of science provided a blanket of objectivity
that protected outrageous and inhumane acts and provided slave-
owners, Nazis, and racists some sense of justification for their
actions. While the reification of race as a scientific category may not
regenerate these exact results, it will lead our society to believe, once
again, that any racial disparities "can be more meaningfully
understood through genetic [rather] than social or environmental
mechanisms." 96 Accordingly, "groups' social and health outcomes
[will be] determined largely by genetic predispositions rather than
social forces and institutional practices." The shift back to a
biological understanding of race implicates potential changes in: (1)
government policy; (2) the legitimacy of science; (3) overall human
development; and (4) the allocation of property rights.
The policies and programs of both state and federal
government that aim to address racial disparities may slowly
disappear as the attention is diverted from "the structural causes of
racial inequities toward genetic explanations and technological
solutions." 97 This abolition of government policies and programs
92. Id. at xi.
93. Id.
94. Id. at vii.
95. Id. at viii.
96. Id. at 1.
97. Id. at xii.
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will be rooted in the transfer of "responsibility for addressing
disparities from the government to the very individuals who suffer
most from inequality." 98 Furthermore, the public is likely to no
longer pressure the government to address issues of racial disparity
if the public is "convinced that race-based technological innovations
can replace the need for social change." 99
As biological theories of race permeate society, these theories
become further legitimized and can thereafter be used as "hard
evidence of a genetic basis of race."t00 This may also result in "less
robust scientific studies or weak correlations" as "[u]nexamined
ideas and assumptions about genetic relevance of race, often
reflecting lay perspectives, may inform research questions and
methodologies."t 0
Furthermore, "increasingly sophisticated arguments that social
categories of race reflect inherent genetic differences" will take a
significant toll on the development of an individual in our society.
One of the main concerns with the reification of race is the
"temptation to use the notion that racial disparities in health are
genetically linked" to explain racial disparities in other areas such as
employment, education, and criminal justice."102 These disparities
may then be "attributed to people's genes rather than to the
treatment groups are afforded and their access to resources."103
Individuals who currently live in impoverished neighborhoods will
never believe they are capable of moving into a better home if their
living situation is alleged a predetermined genetic trait. Even
worse, students in under-resourced schools will be driven to believe
that the education they are receiving is determined by their genetic
predisposition. This may further result in the re-segregation of the
United States and the demise of several values held nationwide.
Finally, the interpretation of race as a fixed genetic trait results
in societal repercussions that perpetuate and continue the vicious
cycle of the unequal distribution of property in this country,
specifically intellectual property rights. Property is a matter of legal
definition and accordingly has become a fundamental constitutional
issue, particularly in the context of race, as property has become the
"medium through which struggles between individual and
collective goals have been refracted."104 Theories of biological
98. Id.
99. Id. at xii-xiii.
100. Id. at 5.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id.
104. K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21
Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. 339, 344 (1999).
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understanding of race may thereby encourage the allocation of
property rights, both traditional and intellectual, according to
genetic dispositions.
The above discussion of the impact of the reification of race
presents potential implications that "resuscitate harmful ideas about
race." Arguably, these implications may not seem as harmful or
dangerous as sterilization or slavery. However, these implications
do stifle the development and progress of humanity by
"reinforc[ing] rather than reduc[ing] inequality."10 5
III. The Social Character of Legal Language: The
Impact of the Court's Use of Racial Categories on
Societal Understanding of Those Terms.
No language stands alone. It draws life from its background. 106
Karl Llewellyn
Theoretically, patent law's role in our society is to offer basic
incentives to innovators to disclose their invention to the public -
what they have discovered and how to make and use the invention
in exchange for exclusive rights. However, in reality, "patents
perform different functions."10 7 Patents serve as a "vehicle for
transmitting messages" by signaling "to markets aspects of [a] firm"
that may be "relevant to potential investors." In addition, patents
communicate normative information, particularly through the
utility doctrine which "delineates inventions that are socially
beneficial."108
Patent litigation epitomizes these functions, communicating
messages about individual inventions to the market and social
norms to society. Patent litigation differs from other litigation
proceedings because of the mere complexity of most patents and
particularly because of the significant part that claim construction
has in the proceeding. The role that legal language plays in patent
litigation, however, is not any different from the role it plays in any
other court or before any other judge. Language, at its core, "is the
process whereby cultural understandings are enacted, created, and
transformed in interaction with social structure." 109 Legal language,
105. Obasogie, supra note 10, at xiii.
106. KARL NICKERSON LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH 79 (Oceana Publications 1960)
(1930).
107. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact ofPatents, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 573, 576
(2006).
108. Id. at 581.
109. Elizabeth Mertz, Language, Law, and Social Meaning: Linguistic/Anthropological
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thereby, has a strong "formative effect on social outcomes and
structures."110
Language, through both oral and written communication,
maintains a pragmatic aspect that allows the influence of a
particular individual, judge or litigant, involved in the case to create
new meanings, relationships, and contexts."11 In fact, "[clareful
attention to the language of the litigants and judges has resulted in a
more precise and sophisticated explication of the process whereby
law participates in social transformation." 1 12 It is without question
that the discourse during patent litigation between, amongst, and of
the litigants and the judges, dictate social transformation.
Therefore, the process of litigating racial categories as claim terms
informs and has power to transform society's understanding of race.
Essentially, due to the social character of language, the court's
understanding of racial categories conveyed through language, both
oral and written, shapes the way society understands and uses racial
categories. This happens as "[t]he socially shared system of
language is constantly being renewed and shaped as it is used by
speakers in social contexts."113 The courtroom is no stranger to
social context. As a result, "language is always responsive to social
forces" and social power.114 Thus, if a court communicates that race
is actually an inherited genetic trait through its construction of a
racialized claim term, it is very likely that over time that any
understanding of race will match the court's construction.
The notion that a court's decision to understand and use
language in one way, is an endorsement that will transform and
influence society's use of that same language is arguably similar to
the notion that the government's granting of a patent is the
government's "imprimatur" of the patent's subject matter and
utility. The imprimatur theory is the presumption that the
government agency's, in this case the USPTO approval of a patent is
the government's endorsement of the subject matter and utility of
the patent. Hence, if the USPTO grants exclusivity to a patentee
whose invention is based on genetic understanding of race, then the
USPTO's approval is perceived as an endorsement of the reification
of race and members of the public may then be encouraged to see
racial disparities as a result of biological differences. 115
Contributions to the Study of Law, 26 Law & Soc'y 413, 423 (1992).
110. Id. at 425.
111. Id. at 419.
112. Id. at 440.
113. Id. at 420.
114. Id.
115. Kahn, supra note 18, at 356 ("Such an imprimatur opens the door to new forms of
discrimination based on genetically reductive conceptions of racial difference. It may
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However, demonstrating the presence of the imprimatur theory
in patent law is rather difficult.116 In patent law, the USPTO does
not employ as a criterion the potential economic worth or moral
utility of an invention. "Rather it merely certifies that it appears that
claimed subject matter is new, unobvious, and has some degree of
practical utility and that the claims are sufficiently definite to
reasonably apprise the public of the metes and bounds of the patent
property." 117 Furthermore, even if the structure of patent law did
not prohibit moral judgment in the examination of patent
applications, "the imprimatur theory requires that citizens
understand [the complex process of patent application and
approval] to connote government approval or sponsorship."1 18
Arguably, "[e]vidence for such understanding is not apparent"
because "[t]he overwhelming majority of the public encounters
[patents] in their roles as product identifiers, not as the beneficiaries
of a federal [legislative] scheme." Therefore, the public is unlikely
to believe that a [patent marking] . .. on a product reflects
government endorsement." 119
Furthermore, an argument based on the imprimatur theory may
be difficult to substantiate because a patent is a private instrument,
similar to traditional property rights over land that one has
purchased. However, an analogy can be further drawn to the
enforcement of racial restrictive covenants in traditional property.
Individuals used racial restrictive covenants to prevent people of
color from moving into certain residential neighborhoods.120 The
states considered these covenants "private discrimination" and
therefore, these individuals' actions did not violate the Fourteenth
also divert public resources from socioeconomic health disparities toward more market-
driven commercial strategies for targeting race-based health difference at the molecular
level."); Ghosh, supra note 19, at 448-49 ("[T]here is arguably at least a symbolic harm
that arises from the use of racial categories in patent law ... [bly countenancing racial
categories in the awarding of patents, the state has acknowledged and aligned itself with
racial stereotypes and animus. As a remedy, the state would need to avoid the use of
racial categories in the patent document itself and in the review of patent applications.").
116. Jeffery Lefstin, Does the First Amendment Bar the Cancelation of REDSKINS, 52 Stan.
L. Rev. 665, 684 (2000) (The imprimatur theory is also challenged in other areas of
intellectual property. In trademark law, the notion that trademark registration connotes
government imprimatur of offensive and scandalous marks is "unequivocally rejected."
Also, the extension of "copyright to pornographic material" is unlikely to be "perceived
as government endorsement.").
117. John Gladstone Mills III, Donald C. Reiley III, and Robert C. Highley, "Patent
Pending" and patent marketing, 1 PAT.L.FUNDAMENTALs 2:16 (2d. ed. 2010).
118. Lefstin, Redskins, supra note 116, at 684.
119. Id.
120. See Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding racial restrictive covenants were
unenforceable in state courts because any such enforcement would amount to "state
action" and therefore violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Amendment of the United States Constitution because the state was
not involved in making the covenants. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court held that these covenants were unenforceable in state courts
because any enforcement would amount to state action.121 Likewise,
"granting of a patent by the state [arguably] promotes invention and
innovation, either as an actual consequence or as a justification,"
thus the state is "supporting private decisions to create racially
tailored inventions through the patent grant." 122 This is allegedly
state action- "the state is making the decision to grant a right to a
specific individual in order to benefit a racially identified group." 12 3
Therefore, this action is "subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause ... to ensure that the racial category is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling interest." 24
In sum, if a district court construed a claim term that uses race
as a genetic trait, one can argue that construing that patent would
foster a perception that the court enforces the reification of race and
thereby encourages the public to do the same. If that notion is too
far-fetched, one can at least contend that a court's use and
understanding of a claim term as a biological category will
transform society's understanding of race over time. Nonetheless, if
courts are going to make normative judgments construing racially
charged claim terms as scientific categories, a strong argument can
be made for the effect of the reification of race on the general welfare
of the United States. This argument is not based on the notion that
judicial enforcement of racialized claim terms may be found as
discriminatory and unconstitutional or that the government's
imprimatur of race-specific patents encourages the reification of race.
Rather that the court's construction of racial categories in claim
terms as inherited genetic traits reignites a pattern and practice that
has caused substantial harm in society and directly affects any
potential survival of the efforts to construe race as a result of social,
historical and cultural events.125
121. Id.
122. Ghosh, supra note 19, at 449.
123. Id. at 453.
124. Id.
125. Terence Dougherty, Group Rights to Cultural Survival: Intellectual Property Rights in
Native American Cultural Symbols, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 355, 386 (1998) ("If courts
are to make normative judgments about the meaning of section 2(a) in light of
Congress's ability to make legislation affecting the general welfare of the United States, a
strong case can be made for the effect of cultural survival on the general welfare of the
United States. This line of reasoning is not based on the fact that trademark protection
of the use of Native American symbols and names by sports teams is merely offensive,
or on the theory that the trademark protection amounts to a government endorsement,
but rather on the reality that the trademark is part of a pattern and practice that causes
irreparable, substantial harm that has a direct effect on the survival of a culture within
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IV. Construing Racialized Claim Terms
The political and jurisprudential treatment of race-specific
patents in the United States has the potential to legitimize the
reification of race and severely impact society's understanding of
racial disparities. Accordingly, with the increase in race-specific
patents, and race-based technology in general, the way that the
courts will construe racial categories in claim terms will determine
the pattern and practice of future race relations in the United States.
As explained in Section I, the Supreme Court delegated the task
of construing claims to the judge. However, like in many other
areas of law, the judge does not have yielding discretion in how
they construe claim terms. Claim terms are entirely context
dependent. Thus, the analysis in Philips, the various canons of
construction, and an overwhelming amount of Federal Circuit
decisions confines a judge's construction of a claim term. Based on
those limits, issues in the construction of race-specific patents are
likely to arise when considering (1) the inventors definition of the
claim, (2) the PHOSITA's understanding of original meaning of the
claim, and (3) the patent's presumption of validity.
The Federal Circuit in Philips held that "intrinsic evidence
serves as the principal source for claim construction and trumps any
extrinsic evidence that would contradict it."126 Prior to Philips, the
Federal Circuit has articulated various canons of construction the
judges may use to interpret claim terms.127 Since Philips did not
the United States. Commercial speech that plays a significant role in the ability of a
culture to survive can certainly be found 'scandalous' within the meaning of section 2(a).
Similarly, it can be seen as 'disparaging' to the point of causing significant harm.").
126.Menell, supra note 21, at 5-31.
127. CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS, 419 (Aspen Publishers, 2008). Some of
the most used canons of constructions are: (1) Where there is an equal choice between a
broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that
indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning,
the notice function of the claim is best served by adopting the narrower meaning; (2) It is
improper to import (or read in) a limitation from the specification's general discussion,
embodiments, and examples. It is improper to eliminate or ignore (read out) a claim
limitation in order to extend a patent to subject matter disclosed, but not claimed; (3)
Claims should be given their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
specification as it would be interpreted by a PHOSITA; (4) Limitations from the
specification should not be read into the claims. In other words, if the claim language is
broad and the examples in the detailed description are narrow, the claim should be
construed broadly; (5) Claim terms are assigned their ordinary and customary meaning
to a PHOSITA (rather than to a judge, jury, or technical expert).
The words in a patent claim should be construed as having their ordinary and
customary meaning to a PHOSITA at the time the patent was filed.; (6) It should be
assumed that claim terms are used consistently throughout the patent. Consequently, a
22 [Vol. 8
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND RACE
materially change these canons nor discourage their use, these
canons provide standards, not rules, for district court judges to
construe claim terms. There is no hierarchy in how these canons can
or should be used. The only requirement, as indicated in Philips, is
that claims are read in light of the specification. 128 In the following
section, the author conducts a hypothetical claim construction of the
patent for DNAWitness, the method used to identify the "Louisiana
Serial Killer," to exemplify the problems judges may face construing
racialized claim terms.
A. The Frudakis Patent: "A Heritable Component of Race"
On August 19, 2003, Frudakis submitted a patent application
entitled "Compositions and Methods for Inferring Ancestry" 129
("Frudakis patent"). The original patent application had 115 claims.
Of the 115 claims, the most relevant claim is Claim 3, stating: "The
method of claim 1, wherein the trait comprises 'biogeographical
ancestry."'130 Claim 3 is a dependent claim, relying on the validity
of Claim 1. If Claim 1 does not meet the statutory requirements for
patentability, Claim 3 will also be invalid. Frudakis claims in Claim
1: "A method of inferring, with predetermined level of confidence, a
trait of an individual... ."131  Therefore, Claim 3 is claiming a
method that determines the biogeographical ancestry of an individual.
patentee may serve as his own lexicographer, and may choose to redefine a claim term
away from its common, ordinary meaning. Most commonly, a patentee will accomplish
this through express redefinition; (7) The existence of a narrower dependent claim
shows that the broader claim from which it depends is not so limited. Claims should be
construed to avoid rendering dependent claims redundant; (8) Finally, the claims should
be interpreted so as to preserve their validity. But this maxim is only to be used as a last
resort when all other constructions would invalidate the claims.
128. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318.
129. The patent prosecution history on this patent application shows an extensive
back and forth with the patent examiner about the method's ability to meet the statutory
requirements for patentability. For the purposes of this paper, only the claims of the
original patent application will be discussed. See supra note 14.
130. U.S. Patent Appl. No 10/644,594.
131. Id. ("Claim 1: A method of inferring, with a predetermined level of confidence, a
trait of an individual, comprising: a) contacting a sample comprising nucleic acid
molecules of a test individual with hybridizing oligonucleotides, wherein the
hybridizing nucleotides can detect nucleotide occurrences of single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs) of a panel of at least about ten ancestry informative markers
(AIMs) indicative of a population structure correlated with the trait, and wherein said
contacting is performed under conditions suitable for detecting the nucleotide
occurrences of the AIMs of the test individual by the hybridizing oligonucleotides; and
b) identifying, with a predetermined level of confidence, a population structure that
correlates with the nucleotide occurrences of the AIMs in the test individual, wherein
the population structure correlates with a trait, thereby inferring, with a predetermined
level of confidence, the trait of the individual.").
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The specification discloses that the "human population structure can
be represented in terms of BioGeographical Ancestry, which is the
heritable component of 'race' or heritage."132 Frudakis goes on,
"[f]or example... [biogeographical ancestry] can refer to 'race' in
terms of 4 groups such as IndoEuropean, East Asians, sub-Saharan
African and Native American." 133 Simply put, the biogeographical
ancestry is "the biological or genetic component of race ... [it] is a
simple and objective description of the ancestral origins of a person,
in terms of the major population groups."134 In the "Summary of
Invention" section, Frudakis explains one method for inferring the
biogeographical ancestry of an individual. He states that he could
compare the proportional ancestries of an individual to a database
that is "associated with a [digital] photograph of a person from
whom the known proportional ancestry was determined, thus
providing a means to further infer physical characteristics of [an]
individual." 135
For the purposes of conducting a claim construction, imagine a
hypothetical situation where the Frudakis patent has already issued
and a private forensic company, Company X, who had never been
in contact with DNAPrint Genomics, marketed a device that creates
a colored sketch of criminals using a database of digital photographs
that compare genetic markers of suspects DNA to the photographs
in the database. Frudakis sues Company X for infringement of his
"Compositions and Methods for Inferring Ancestry" patent.
Company X responded to the infringement, allegation claiming that
the Frudakis patent is invalid and should have never been issued in
the first place. Company X contends that the patent does not meet
the statutory requirement of definiteness in 35 U.S.C. §11212 as the
term "biogeographical ancestry" cannot be meaningfully applied.
Both the interpretation of the claims and the finding of definiteness
require an analysis of the term biogeographical ancestry.
First, the parties must present to the judge which claim terms
they contend are in dispute and the judge finds which of the claim
terms are actually disputed and need to be construed. Here, the
judge will find that the term biogeographical ancestry must be
construed in order to determine if the alleged infringing device
actually infringes the Frudakis patent and if the Frudakis patent is
invalid. Since the disputed claim term has been determined, the
court will proceed with the Markman hearing.
When construing a claim term, the judge always starts with the
132. Id. at [0007].
133. Id.
134. Id. at [0155].
135. Id. at [0037].
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claim itself and the specification. According to one of the canons,
there is a strong case for construing biogeographical ancestry
according to the patentee's definition and the method offered to
measure the trait. The Federal Circuit has often stated that the
patentee is free to be his own lexicographer.13 6 Arguably, since
Frudakis uses biogeographical ancestry consistently throughout the
specification, the specification reveals a special meaning and that
meaning governs. Thus, Frudakis may serve as his own
lexicographer and may choose to redefine a claim term away from
its common, ordinary meaning. Therefore, a judge would construe
biogeographical ancestry as a trait one inherits from their ancestors,
conveying race as a biological category.
Perhaps the judge finds that Frudakis's definition of
biogeographical ancestry in the specification has potential to confuse a
jury. The judge is then expected to determine the ordinary meaning
that a PHOSITA would give to biogeographical ancestry in the context
of the patent, and in light of intrinsic and noncontradictory extrinsic
evidence. In view of that, the first thing the court must do is
determine who would be a PHOSITA for the Frudakis patent. In
general, the PHOSITA is a "hypothetical person, judicially endowed
with those traits thought to best serve the goals of the patent
system ... [they are] presumed to have read, understood, and
remembered every existing reference from the prior art [and] ...
possesses the level of creativity typical of persons in the relevant art
and of relevant skill level. . . ."137 With that in mind, in construing
the claim term biogeographical ancestry, would the PHOSITA be a
doctor, anthropologist, social scientist, a geneticist, or something
else?
The PHOSITA would need to be of both relevant art and
relevant skill. Here, the relevant art would be population genetics
and unsurprisingly, the relevant skill level would be a population
geneticist. Population genetics is a field that looks at how
evolutionary forces shape groups' genetic makeup. A population
geneticist, therefore, is one who studies the genetic composition of
biological populations and the changes in genetic composition that
result from the operation of various factors, including natural
selection. With a PHOSITA in place, the court would then turn to
the patent specification to determine how a population geneticist
would understand the ordinary meaning of biogeographical ancestry.
The ordinary meaning is not a meaning that a "layperson
would ascribe to the claim term" or a meaning that "signif[ies]
136. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
137. Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law's PHOSITA Standard,
23 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH. 227, 235 (2009).
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abstract meaning or meaning in a vacuum," 38 but the meaning that
a PHOSITA would attribute to the claim term. Proper construction
of the claim term "depends critically upon how the term is used in
the patent."139 The judge would find that biogeographical ancestry is
not a term that Frudakis created, but an "industry euphemism" that
is more often than not understood as race.140 In fact, "[a]dvocates of
genetic genealogy tests[, such as population geneticist,] rarely use
the term race" and prefer biogeographical ancestry.141  This
understanding of the claim term fits in the context of the patent. In
the specification, Frudakis defines biogeographical ancestry as "the
heritable component of 'race' or heritage."142 Therefore, a judge
would find the ordinary meaning of biogeographical ancestry is
simply race, the inherited genetic trait.
Therefore, it seems as though the specification provides the
judge with plenty of information to use in construing the ordinary
meaning and scope of the claim term biogeographical ancestry. Thus,
it is unlikely that the court will look to extrinsic evidence to define
biogeographical ancestry because "the intrinsic evidence was
sufficiently clear to resolve the claim construction dispute."143
Finally, the court should make sure to construe the claim term
in a manner that preserves the validity of the patent. Section 282 of
the Patent Act provides that the "rigor of the USPTO's examination
process should render an issue patent presumptively valid." 144
Here, there is an argument that construing biogeographical ancestry as
race results in an invalid claim for lack of patentable subject matter.
A recent decision found that a method for isolating human genes
and comparing their sequences was not patentable subject matter
because a natural phenomenon cannot be patented. 145  Here,
Frudakis is claiming a method that compares DNA sequences to
determine a "trait." A method to determine race is arguably not
"markedly different from native DNA."146 Therefore, construing the
claim as race may invalidate the patent.
When canons are competing or contradictory, the judge must
use reason and discretion in interpreting the claim. Here, there
138. Menell, supra note 21, at 5-50.
139. Id. at 5-51.
140. Obasogie, supra note 10, at 17.
141. Id. at 19.
142. U.S. Patent Appl. No 10/644,594 at [0007].
143. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc. 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
144. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
145. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp.
2d 181, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), as amended (Apr. 5, 2010) ("Because the claimed isolated
DNA is not markedly different from native DNA as it exists in nature, it constitutes
unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.").
146. Id.
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seems to be competing or contradictory canons. The judge could
construe biogeographical ancestry according to the definition and
explanation provided by Frudakis in the specification, which the
court in Philips determines as the "single best guide" for
determining the meaning of a claim. 47 But if the judge construes
the claim in that manner, the presumption of validity would not be
preserved. Thus, the judge in this case may exercise the discretion
to impact an understanding of racial categories that is not based in
science.
Even if the court was to construe biogeographical ancestry as an
inherited genetic trait, there is an issue in whether the public can
meaningfully apply the claim term. If not, then the patent is invalid
as it does not meet the statutory requirements of section 112 for
definiteness. The issue with the claim term biogeographical ancestry is
language is not as precise as the subject matter requires. DNA, a
gene or a genetic sequence, may be patented, if the naturally
occurring gene is synthesized from its original state and ascribed a
useful function. Therefore, any other geneticist will find difficulty
in understanding what exactly Frudakis is claiming in this patent,
even when read in light of the specification, because it seems as
though Frudakis is claiming DNA itself. A valid patent would
therefore grant Frudakis the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling any DNA without his permission, a rather
outrageous grant of authority.148
This analysis is far from complete and nowhere near the depth
of interpretation that the Federal Circuit or a district court judge
might engage in during a Markman hearing. Nonetheless, this mere
scratch of the surface presents many issues regarding the
construction of racialized patents that do not include racial
categories in their claims.
B. Problems Construing Racialized Claim Terms
The attempted construction of biogeographical ancestry
demonstrated some issues that may arise in the construction of race-
specific patents. Notably, the Frudakis patent is not a race-specific
patent since it is not aimed at one cohort of society. Nonetheless,
this patent does present the same issues a race-specific patent
obtaining rights based on a social scheme that they have
transformed into biological categories would raise in the context of
(1) the inventors definition of the claim, (2) the original meaning
147. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
148. The prosecution history of the patent shows that the patent examiner noticed this
flaw. The patent was rejected for lack of patentable subject matter.
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according to PHOSITA, and (3) the presumption of validity surface.
The canons of construction provide support for various
constructions of the same claim term. Often, each party's respective
position can find support in at least one of the canons listed above.
District Court Judge Ronald Whyte has noted that the canons of
construction "seem difficult to reconcile." 149 In Philips, the Federal
Circuit addressed and seemingly dismissed the potential
contradictions that arise from these canons. There the court asserted
that a line can be "discerned with reasonable certainty and
predictability."15 0 The court further argued, "upon reading the
specification in.. . context, it will become clear whether the patentee
is setting out specific examples of the invention to accomplish [the
goals of the invention], or whether the patentee instead intends for
the claims and embodiments in the specification to be strictly
coextensive."151 This indicates that the Federal Circuit "believed
that reading the patent would clarify the applicable canon [to be
used] in each case." 152 The reality of claim construction, however,
does not present such clarity.
i. The Inventor as a Lexicographer Canon
A patentee is free to be his own lexicographer.153  Thus,
patentees are given the ultimate power to design their own
definition of a claim term. "The only caveat is that any special
definition given to a word must be clearly defined in the
specification."1 54 In general, this seems like a good idea since the
inventions tended to be technological advances in "objective
science" and hence there is not a likelihood that there would be a
social construction to the claim term.155 However, when the claim
terms are historically charged words, is it justifiable to confer to the
patentee the right to be their own lexicographer?
As shown by my very basic claim interpretation of
biogeographical ancestry, it is likely that a judge would have to follow
the interpretive path presented above since Frudakis diligently
including a definition and explanation of biogeographical ancestry that
149. Kathleen M. O'Malley et al., A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the
Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 675 (2004).
150. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
151. Id.
152. David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 223, 231 (2008).
153. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979-80.
154. Id.
155. See Datamize, 417 F.3rd 1342 (construing the claim term, "aesthetic," which is a
social, not objective, word).
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is consistent throughout the patent and his definition of
biogeographical ancestry is similar to the ordinary meaning a
PHOSITA would give to the claim term. In that sense, the "inventor
as a lexicographer" canon provides a patentee of a race-specific
patent the power and control to dictate how to construe a racial
categories in claim terms. Therefore, concern in the claim
construction of race-specific patents is not about who has a property
right in the term "race" or "black" but in who has the power to
determine the meaning of the term. Given the rise of race-specific
patents and the drive to commodify race, allowing patentees the
right to define racial categories, particularly as biological, allows
patentees to use the patent system as a tool to reignite the race
science fire. The current structure of the patent law system,
however, does not allow judges to interpret otherwise.156
The fear of conferring the right to define racial categories as
scientific solely to the inventors may encourage judges to adopt a
bright-line rule eliminating the use of the "inventor as
lexicographer" canon when construing race-specific patents.
However, such a bright-line rule fails to take into consideration the
sui generis element of the patent system. Each patent is, sui generis,
of its own kind. Race-specific patents are not limited to the
pharmaceutical or medical arenas, but can also be found in more
"conventional commodities such as toys and cosmetics." 157 Thus,
the fact that a patent may have a racialized claim term does not
guarantee that an inventor will attempt to construe the racial
category as scientific. For instance, a patent for hair products may
present a claim that states: "a method for pressing African American
hair." The claim term, "African American," is a racial category, yet
the patentee would arguably construe "African American" based on
a categorization of physical characteristics and not a genetic basis. It
is difficult to argue that this patentee should not be granted the right
to define "African American" hair. Accordingly, the element of sui
generis in patent law presents yet another issue in the construction of
racialized claim terms.
The "inventor as a lexicographer" canon also raises questions of
race-based research. In order to create his or her own definition, a
patentee must conduct some research. Thereby, some level of race-
based research is assumed to occur in order to develop race-specific
patents. When considering the role of race-based research, is
allowing a person to get patents based on race-based research
156. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 ("In short, a court must presume that the terms in the
claim mean what they say, and, unless otherwise compelled, give full effect to the
ordinary and accustomed meaning of claim terms.").
157. Ghosh, supra note 19, at 410.
Winter 2011] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND RACE 29
pernicious? If so, one could argue that the patent system should not
subsidize such "dangerous" research. Yet, many of the same groups
that are doing the race-based research for race-specific patents are
also publishing papers on similar topics. Accordingly, does
granting a race-based patent pose more of a risk that publication of a
study purporting to show that "Drug X disproportionately benefits
(or harms) Race Y?" If so, the argument seems to be that granting
property rights in such information poses a threat that the
information itself does not. Thus, one must assess where the harm
is in race-based research itself. Or rather, is the harm in obtaining
the patent based on such research? Arguably, such research is to be
discouraged because it uses the patent system as an instrument for
discrimination. However, if the USPTO denies a patent simply
based on the use of race-based research, then the USPTO is making
a judgment based on the moral utility of the patent, a practice that is
rejected in the patent system.158 Since the patent system is not the
venue to make moral judgments, this kind of research cannot
necessarily be discouraged. This question is not one that can be
answered in this context, yet it was necessary to address.
Regardless of the answer to the question of the harm in race-based
research, the interpretive process does provide an avenue to address
the use of racialized claim terms.
ii. Who is a PHOSITA?
If a judge was to determine that the specification did not
present a special meaning for biogeographical ancestry, according to
Philips, the judge is to assign biogeographical ancestry the ordinary
and customary meaning to a person having skill in the art
("PHOSITA").159 Supposedly, determining a PHOSITA is as simple
as looking to "the inventor's education level, the nature of the field's
typical problems, the skill required to grapple with the prior
solutions to the field's problems, the pace of innovation in the field,
the sophistication of technology, and the educational level of the
people working in the field." 160 However, there is still ambiguity in
the courts of who the PHOSITA is and how the PHOSITA can be
determined. The Federal Circuit has attempted to give some
meaning to PHOSITA in its recent case, KSR v. Telefex161 but
literature acknowledges that this issue is still prevalent and
158. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
159. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
160. Menell, supra note 21, at 11-47 (citing Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713
F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
161. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
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therefore, a PHOSITA of a racial category is still very unclear.
The concept of a PHOSITA implies the objectivity of language.
However, when construing racialized claim terms as inherited
genetic traits, the objectivity disappears. Population geneticists do
not attribute racial disparities to the social and historical
development of this country. The original meaning attributed to
racialized claim terms is an understanding that race is one that is
inherited.
Interestingly, deriving meaning from a PHOSITA indicates that
the ordinary meaning of the claim term is a social construct. Race is
arguably a social construct. Therefore, when construing a racialized
claim term from the perspective of a PHOSITA, would the original
meaning of the racialized claim term fit the understanding of race as
a social construct and avoid the genetic understanding of race
completely? This question presents some difficulties. When faced
with a race based technological claim term, a PHOSITA must be
versed in both the technology and the understanding that race is
socially constructed. It seems impossible to define a group of
PHOSITA when the intersection of race-based technology occurs.
iii. The Judge's Discretion
Given the dangerous social implications of race science, when
faced with a race-specific patent with claim terms that construe race
as a fixed genetic trait, a judge should exercise their discretion.
Exercising their discretion does not call for a judge to throw out a
patent with racialized claim terms completely but does call for a
judge to impart a meaning of racial categories that is more
representative of race as a social construct. Exercising their
discretion may however mean moving away from the canons of
construction or not reading the claim term completely in light of the
specification. Judges must exercise the discretion to construe racial
categories in a manner that is more representative of the modern
understanding of race. Although this notion goes against
established rule against moral judgments in the current patent
systeml 62 and may eventually lead down a slippery slope, the future
162. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (1999) (upholding
patent for post-mixing beverage dispenser with a false pre-mixing dispenser attached,
where deceptive function of false dispenser was found useful). Intellectual property
scholars have examined the impact of the legal attempts to intervene on moral issues. See
Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998);
Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805 (2005); Arnold H. Loewy,
Distinguishing Government Suppression of Speech From Government Support of Speech, 6
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 171 (2007). Nonetheless, inventions, with moral implications, are
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of race relations in this country demands judges to take this step.
The United States patent system "hinges on a principle of
neutrality, whereby the system neither supports nor discriminates
against technologies."163 Unsurprisingly, most judges and scholars
recognize intellectual property as a neutral area of law,164 arguably
because intellectual property rights are granted when only certain
statutory requirements are met. This perception, however, is a vast
misunderstanding as shown by the discussion of race-specific
patents. "Intellectual property law does not function simply in a
rule-like fashion, nor is it merely a regime of rights and
obligations."165 Intellectual property rights are the same property
rights that have been "contingent on, intertwined with, and
conflated with race"166 throughout our history. As such, it is
important that the patent law system recognizes the lack of
neutrality that race-specific patents do maintain. Therefore,
although granting judges the discretion to apply a socially
construed understanding of race during claim construction is at
complete odds with the patent system and common law, the history
of race science has taught us that such change must occur. The
overarching goal of patent law is to further knowledge with
expectation that the public will benefit from technological
innovations. However, no benefit will ensue if, as racial categories
are construed as scientific in the courtroom, society thinks and acts
in a manner that believes what has been socially construed is
actually a result of genetics.
patented without concern of their social impact. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive
Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. R. 573 (2006); Ghosh, supra note 19, at 13.
163. Danielle K. Miller, A Patent on the Conscious: A Theoretical Perspective of Law on
Patentable Life, STAN. J. OF ANIMAL L. & POL., 145, 158 (2009).
164. Greene, supra note 104, at 343 (1999) ("An underlying assumption of race-
neutrality pervades copyright scholarship."); Sonia Kaytal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57
UCLA L. Rev. 1601 ("There is an unresolved conflict within intellectual property. Even
though most scholar and judges treat intellectual property law as a predominantly
content neutral phenomenon, each area of law -patents, copyrights, and trademarks -
contain statutory and common law presumptions that are indelibly rooted in content-
based considerations, and therefore intrinsically raise constitutional concerns."); Steven
H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence and the Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 43, 45 n. 10 (1995) ("Critical race theory... [emphasizes] the extent to which
claims of neutrality and universality are in reality proxies for racist political and cultural
assumptions. In the same vein, feminist jurisprudence emphasizes the gendered
character of claims of neutrality and universality.").
165. Rosemary J. Coombe, Critical Cultural Studies, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN 463, 481
(1998).
166. Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714 (1993).
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V. The Dilemma: How Should a Judge Construe
Racialized Claim Terms Given the Implications of
the Reification of Race
"To focus on patents as an incentive to invent ignores the
broader social context in which invention occurs and patents
operate. To ignore this context is to ignore the ways in which the
jurisprudence of race and that of intellectual property connect."167
The Frudakis patent provided an example of what can be
expected in the claim construction of a race-specific patent.
Therefore, the issue of who has power to control how racial
categories are interpreted arises. If the power is given solely to an
inventor, then race will likely be interpreted as a genetic trait.
However, if the power is given to a judge, who would also take into
consideration a PHOSITA, there is possibility to incorporate an
understanding of race that is socially and historically accurate.
Furthermore, the way judges and the courts talk about race in the
realm of patent law has the possibility to impact the way a
PHOSITA and society as whole think of race.
This section will present how "race" has been understood and
interpreted by the Supreme Court and suggest that judges should
use "intersectionality"168 to construe patent claims in the future.
Intersectionality encourages courts to avoid the presumption of
singular categories of identity, avoiding the "treatment of racial
categories as functionally objective" and devaluing the
"socioeconomic and political history of those placed within
them." 169 When construing claims, judges would understand that
race is the interrelatedness of the dynamics of identity categories-
biological, social, and historical- thereby allowing judges to.
consciously construe patent claims.
There are two major frameworks for defining the proper
treatment of race in social political context: colorblindness and race
167. Ghosh, supra note 19, at 413-414.
168. Kaytal, supra note 164, at 6 ("Intersectionality's main gift has been in forcing the
law to recognize the multiplicity of different identities that circulate within a particular
embodiement, and to take into account the unique intersection of overlapping categories
of identity ... instead of recognizing the intersection of economic, cultural, and
commercial aspects ... the law overwhelmingly focuses on one aspect ot the exclusion of
others, generating a fragmented set of principles, rather than taking into account the
possibility of a more sophisticated and comprehensive approach.").
169. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of'Our Constitution is Color-Blind,' 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26
(1991).
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consciousness.170  "Advocates for colorblind policies assert that
racism has ceased to be the cause of social inequities while race
conscious policies are promoted as necessary means for remedying
persistent institutional racism."171 The Supreme Court has taken a
"color-blind" approach to interpreting the Constitution since Justice
Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson said, "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."172
Alternatively, the Court has overwhelmingly rejected the
notion of a race conscious government action. In Shaw v. Hunt, the
Court stated, "an effort to alleviate the effects of societal
discrimination is not a compelling interest." 7 3 In Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, the Court held, "[slocietal discrimination, without
more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy."174 Justice O'Connor then added in her concurring opinion,
"a governmental agency's interest in remedying 'societal'
discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own
actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass
constitutional muster."175 And finally, in its recent decision, Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, the Supreme Court
outwardly rejected taking a race conscious approach and continuing
the path of the colorblind approach.176 There the Court held that the
district's action is "contrary to our rulings that remedying past
societal discrimination does not justify race-conscious government
action."7 7 Nonetheless, the government has "voluntarily adopted
race conscious measures to improve conditions of race."17 8 For
instance, "Congress has enacted numerous race-conscious statutes
that illustrate that principle or rely upon its validity."179
The approach offered in this paper is more in line with the race
conscious approach the government has adopted, suggesting that
judges consider the impact of interpreting racial categories as a
genetic trait when construing claim terms. In effect, suggesting
170. Obasogie, supra note 10, at xii.
171. Id.
172. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion); see Gotanda, supra note 169, at 2.
173. 517 U.S. 899, 909-910 (1996).
174. 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1985).
175. Id. at 288.
176. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
177. Id.
178. Id., 551 U.S. at 828-29 (No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §
6311(b)(2)(C)(v) (2000 ed., Supp. IV); § 1067 et seq. (authorizing aid to minority
institutions). In fact, without being exhaustive, I have counted 51 federal statutes that
use racial classifications. I have counted well over 100 state statutes that similarly
employ racial classifications. Presidential administrations for the past half-century have
used and supported various race-conscious measures.).
179. Id.
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judges take a race conscious approach to claim construction of race-
specific patents. Arguably, the Supreme Court would disagree with
this approach, as it "cannot justify government race-based decision
making."180 Thus, the intersectionality would not pass constitutional
muster under the current Supreme Court.181
The problem with the Court's approach, and predicted rejection
of intersectionality, is that, more often than not, the Court fails to
"recognize ties between the classification scheme of one statute and
the treatment of race in other legislation." 1 82 The Court's current
application of the colorblind approach encourages an understanding
of race that is unconnected to the "historical reality of Black
oppression"183 finding race as an attribute of individuality unrelated
to social relations.184 However, race is not a stable, "coherent legal
and social concept." 185 An analysis of racial categorization in
America, "the practice of classifying people in a socially determined
and socially determinative way," 186 shows that racial categories are
historically and socially contingent. Racial categories such as White
and Black are highly contextualized, with powerful, deeply
embedded social and political meanings. Race, itself, is a "unique
social formation with its own meanings, understandings, discourses,
and interpretative frameworks. As a socially constructed category
with multiple meanings, race cannot be easily isolated from lived
social experience." 187
If the Federal Circuit and the district courts take the "color-
blind" approach to claim interpretation, the courts analysis of claims
in light of specifications may perpetuate racial disparities. This
paper suggests that the judges conducting the claim construction of
racialized claim terms must do more than analyze the intrinsic
evidence, and in some cases, even the extrinsic evidence. Judges,
when giving meaning to words such as "race," "Black," or "White,"
must incorporate intersectionality to give a complete meaning to the
claim term and avoid looking at the racial category as a fixed or
objective trait. For instance, returning to the Frudakis patent,
Frudakis claimed biogeographical ancestry and in his specification
180. Id. at 767-68
181. Id. at 702 ("Any 'governmental distributions of burdens or benefits based on
individual racial classifications are reviewed under strict scrutiny' ... To meet the strict
scrutiny test, one must 'demonstrate that their use of such classifications is "narrowly
tailored" to achieve a "compelling" government interest.').
182. Id.
183. Gotanda, supra note 169, at 43.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 23.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 63.
Winter 2011] 35
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
defined the term as a "heritable component of race." Instead of
applying canon that allows the inventor to define the claim terms,
the judge must incorporate an understanding of "race" that is an
intersection of the biological explanation Frudakis provided with
the socially construed understanding of race that the judge has
established. Therefore, instead of determining that a PHOSITA
would understand race as a biological category, a district court
judge or the Federal Circuit would acknowledge how that
understanding of race came to fruition, both socially and
historically, in that field and apply the PHOSITA analysis
accordingly. While this method of intersectionality may seem to go
against general, although inconsistent, understandings of claim
interpretation, intersectionality does avoid an understanding of the
racial term as a fixed trait but as product of many dynamics.
The effect of adoption of intersectionality does not mean the
rejection of a potential patent using racialized claim terms.
Racialized claim terms are going to be a part of patents. Therefore,
intersectionality offers a way to promote societal understanding of
race that continues the progress instead of regressing to race science.
This note is not asking judges to react to racialized claim terms
when action is not called for. However, judges have a duty to meet
societal demands of justice. Thus, if a judge does find a claim term
that is applied in a way that reifies race as a scientific category then
the judge should, on his or her own motion call for an interpretation
of that claim. This changes the role of the judge in patent law as
merely a finder of fact and exults the judge as an administrator of
justice.
Conclusion
The political and jurisprudential treatment of race-specific
patents in the United States has the potential to legitimize the
reification of race and severely impact society's understanding of
racial disparities. Accordingly, with the increase in race-specific
patents, and race-based technology in general, the courts approach
to construing racial categories in claim terms will determine the
pattern and practice of future race relations in the United States.
Thus, whether the power to define what we, as a society, means by
race is in the hands of either an inventor, with aims of
commodification, or a judge, an arbitrator of justice. If we detach
the "unemployment rate, educational underachievement, and
grossly disproportionate representation in the criminal justice
system. .. from society's long history of discriminatory practices,
and [these injustices] become intertwined with assumptions about
groups inherent (and inheritable) tendancies[,]" then biological
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theories of racial inferiority may be "legitim[ized] in new and
different terms, shaping how we understand inequalities in other
fields."188 Therefore, this issue is not the commodification of race,
the discriminatory implications of race-specific patents, or the
alleged government imprimatur of race-specific patents. The issue
is that the court's construction of racial categories in claim terms as
inherited genetic traits reignites a pattern and practice within race
relations that has caused substantial harm in society and that can
directly affect any potential survival of the efforts to construe race as
a result of social, historical and cultural events.
188. Obasogie, supra note 10, at 14.
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